While it is known previously that the cycle lengths of individual components of the AES round function are very small, we demonstrate here that the cycle length of the S-box combined with the ShiftRow and MixColumn transformation is at least 10
Introduction
The cipher Rijndael was selected in 2000 as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and was designed to resist known attacks to block ciphers up to that time. In particular, Rijndael is considered to be immune to differential cryptanalysis [2] and linear cryptanalysis [6] , cf. [10] . On the other hand, in order to achieve a good performance on different platforms, the components of Rijndael operate completely on the Galois field GF (2 8 ). Some recent algebraic analyses of the AES try to exploit the algebraic structure of the finite field GF (2 8 ) which lead to algebraic relations and simple algebraic representations (cf. [4] , [8] , and [15] ). The analysis of such mathematical properties can lead to new cryptanalytic insights and approaches. In many cases this seems to be the only way to find cryptographic weaknesses. Regularities of algorithm components, such as short cycles, "inner structures" or symmetries can yield starting points for attacks.
In this paper we present some new results on the algebraic properties of the AES round function. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we first give a short description of the AES round function and fix some definitions and notations with respect to invariances and permutation groups. In Section 3 we summarize known results on the cyclic order of basic components of the AES round function and provide some new results. In Section 4 we present a number of new invariances of the AES round function with the all zero subkey. In addition, we have found more invariances of some powers of this round function. From the result proved in [13] that the set of AES round functions generates the alternating group on {0, 1}
128 , it follows that the existence of nontrivial invariances which hold for all 2 128 AES round subkeys can be excluded. In Section 5 we compute different cycle lengths of the AES round function under the all zero subkey exploiting the invariances found in Section 4. The cycle computations performed in Section 5 show that the cyclic order of this round function has by far not the small size as the cyclic orders of its components. In Section 6 we consider selfduality properties of the AES round function and we derive a property analogous to the complementation property of the DES round function.
Preliminaries

Description of the AES Round Function
We now give a short description of the AES round function. The AES is defined for 128-bit blocks and key sizes 128, 192, and 256 bits (cf. [9] ). The bytes b i of the state space of the AES are written in matrix form:
In the following we write the state of the AES as a byte vector of the form 16 ) with meaning as a matrix of the form as indicated above. A round of Rijndael proceeds in the following 4 consecutive operations on {0, 1}
128
(cf. [9] ): To every byte of the state the S-Box is applied (ByteSub), the bytes of the rows of the state matrix are shifted (ShiftRow ), every byte-column is mixed by a linear transformation (MixColumn), and finally, the state is XORed with the 128-bit subkey (AddRoundKey).
The S-box of Rijndael is composed as the inversion in the Galois field GF (2 8 ) modulo the irreducible polynomial x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1, followed by an affine transformation (see [9] for details). The application of the inversion in GF ( 2 8 ), resp. the affine transformation described above to the 16 bytes of the state is denoted by I and A, respectively.
In the ShiftRow operation, the bytes of row i of the state are rotated i places to the left, where i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
In the MixColumn operation, each column of the state is considered as a polynomial over GF (2 8 ) and multiplied modulo x 4 + 1 with the polynomial
The ShiftRow, MixColum, AddRoundKey operation is denoted by S, M , and X, respectively.
Definitions and Notation
Let Y be a nonempty finite set and let G be a permutation group on Y , i.e., a subgroup of the group of bijective mappings of Y to itself. G is called transitive if, for any pair of elements (y, y ) ∈ Y 2 , there is a permutation f ∈ G with f (y) = y , otherwise G is said to be intransitive. The cyclic order of an element f ∈ G is the cardinality of the cyclic subgroup generated by f or, in other words, the least natural number n > 0 such that f n (y) = y for all y ∈ Y . Further information on the theory of permutation groups can be found in [11] or [14] .
Let f : {0, 1} 128 → {0, 1} 128 denote an operation on the state space of Rijndael. A property P ⊆ {0, 1}
128 , P = ∅, is called an invariance of f , if P is preserved by f , i.e., for every x ∈ P it follows that f (x) ∈ P .
In this paper we use the notation (f • g)(x) = g(f (x)) for compositions of functions f, g. The cardinality of a set Y is denoted by |Y |. Furthermore, we write F 2 for the Galois field with two elements.
Cyclic Order of Components of I • A • S • M
In this section we summarize known results on the cyclic order of (compositions of) basic components of the Rijndael round function and provide some new results.
Clearly, the cyclic order of I, S, X, X = id, is 2, 4, 2, respectively. Song and Seberry showed that the cyclic order of the MixColumn operation M is 4 (cf. [12] ). Because the cycle lengths for I • A applied to bytes are 87, 81, 59, 27, 2, the cyclic order of I • A applied to the AES state space is the least common multiple of 87, 81, 59, 27, 2 which is 277182 (cf. [12] ). Then it follows that the cyclic order of I • A • S is 554364 (cf. [12] ) which is the least common multiple of 277182 and 4. Murphy and Robshaw [7] showed that the order of
Proposition 1. The cyclic order of the affine transformation A is 4.
Proof. According to [3] , the affine transformation A can be written as a mapping of the ring
where
The next two propositions summarize the results about the cyclic orders for step-2 and step-3 compositions of basic components of the AES round function. The cyclic orders of the mappings I • A and I • A • S were stated by Song and Seberry in [12] . 4, 8, 8, respectively. Proof. From the preceding proposition it follows that the cyclic order of A • S must be 4. Because the S • M -mapping is F 2 -linear, it can be represented by a 128 × 128-matrix over F 2 , whose order is 8. It remains to prove the result for the cyclic order of M • X. We consider M as an element in the ring Mat 128 (F 2 ) of 128 × 128-matrices over F 2 . Let E denote the unit element of Mat 128 (F 2 ). Then
Proposition 2. The cyclic order of
where y denotes an 128-bit vector over F 2 and x denotes the 128-bit key added by X. Since (M + E) 4 
8 (y) = y for all 128-bit vectors y over F 2 . Because there exist cycles for M • X of length 8, the cyclic order of M • X is 8. Note that the invariances of (
Proposition 3. The cyclic order of
I • A • S, A • S • M , S • M • X for X = id,Inv 1 = {(x, x, x, ..., x)|x ∈ GF (2 8 )}, Inv 2 = {(x, y, x, y, x, y, ..., x, y)|x, y ∈ GF (2 8 )}, Inv 3 = {(w, x, y, z, w, x, y, z, w, x, y, z, w, x, y, z)|w, x, y, z ∈ GF (2 8 )}, Inv 4 = {(w, x, w, x, y, z, y, z, w, x, w, x, y, z, y, z)|w, x, y, z ∈ GF (2 8 )}, Inv 5 = {(w, x, y, z, y, z, w, x, w, x, y, z, y, z, w, x)|w, x, y, z ∈ GF (2 8 )},I • A • S • M ) 2 resp. (I • A • S • M ) 4
listed in Propositions 6 and 7 are not invariances of
I • A • S • M .
Proposition 8. There exist no invariances P of
128 which hold for all 2 128 round subkeys.
Proof. The existence of a nontrivial invariance of I • A • S • M • X that holds for all 2
128 round subkeys would imply that the permutation group generated by all 2 128 round functions is intransitive. But this contradicts the fact from [13] that this group is the alternating group on {0, 1}
128 . 2
Remark 1. The same argument shows that for any natural number n > 0 there are no nontrivial invariances P of (I • A • S • M • X)
n which hold for all 2 128·n combinations of n round subkeys. 2
Nevertheless, for special sets of round functions we obtain the following invariances. This means that for round subkeys and input blocks with one of the structures given above, the round function of AES has some strong regularities. From the size of the invariance Inv 6 , we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. There exists a set of AES round functions R with |R| = 2
64 such that the permutation group generated by R is intransitive.
2
One cannot expect that these invariances can be extended to the complete AES because the AES key scheduling is designed to avoid regularities.
On the Cyclic Order of I • A • S • M
Because the mappings I, A, S, M and their concatenations I • A, A • S, S • M , I • A • S, and A • S
• M all have relatively small cyclic orders, it is important to check whether this causes small cyclic orders of the AES round functions. The round function I • A • S • M with the all zero round subkey is intuitively one of the first candidates for which a small cyclic order seems to be possible. The results of Section 4 can be exploited to find out a lower bound for the cyclic order of this round function. Consider the invariance sets of the permutation I • A • S • M given in Section 4. Since a cycle starting from a point of an invariance set can only contain points of this set, the cycle length is limited by the size of the invariance set. Because we have |Inv i | ≤ 2 32 for i = 1, ..., 5, it is possible to compute such cycles on a PC. Table 1 lists all cycle lengths according to the invariances Inv 1 , ..., Inv 5 . Note that the cycles from the invariance Inv 3 are related to those provided in the Appendix of [12] . The Appendix provides a complete listing of the cycles for Inv 1 , ..., Inv 5 .
The least common multiple of the computed cycle lengths for the invariances Inv 1 , ..., Inv 5 of Table 1 Starting from other points in other invariance sets still other cycles can be found. This way the lower bound can be further increased essentially.
It follows that the cyclic order of I • A • S • M has by far not the small size as the cyclic orders of its components, but for points from invariance sets short cycles may occur. Furthermore, the cyclic order of I • A • S • M is much greater than the number 2 128 of AES blocks.
Self-duality of the AES Round Function
According to [1] , two block ciphers E and E are called dual to each other if there are invertible transformations f , g, and h such that
holds for all keys k and plaintexts x. Any cipher is trivially dual to itself, but sometimes there are nontrivial invertible transformations for a cipher onto itself such that the equation above holds for all k and x, as is the case for the DES (cf.
[5], p. 248). In [1] the question is considered whether the AES block encryption has self-duality properties, i.e.:
Do nontrivial invertible transformations f , g, h exist such that for the AES block encryption for all plaintext blocks x and all keys k the equation
In this section we show that this question has a positive answer according to the AES round function.
For any natural number n > 0, let S n denote the symmetric group of degree n, i.e., the permutation group on the set {1, ..., n}. Now we set π 0 := (1 6 11 16), 128 :
Although one cannot expect that this property can be extended to the complete AES mapping, the property of Proposition 10 opens some new possibilities for protection against side channel attacks. Furthermore, Proposition 10 is related to the results provided in Appendix A of [15] where the expressions of the 128 bit-components of the AES round function have many similarities and partially the same component expressions.
On the basis of Proposition 10 it is possible to derive self-duality properties of the AES round function. If X is added, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 2.
There exists a permutation group G of order |G| = 6144 such that for any byte-permutation π ∈ G, there exists a byte-permutation π such that
128 and x ∈ {0, 1} 128 . 2
If we consider in Corollary 2 the special case π = π , then we find the following byte permutations (written as products of cycles, the bytes are enumerated as described in Section 2.1). P 1 = (1 5 9 13)(2 6 10 14)(3 7 11 15)(4 8 12 16), P 2 = (1 9)(5 13)(2 10)(6 14)(3 11)(7 15)(4 12)(8 16), P 3 = (1 13 9 5)(2 14 10 6)( 3 15 11 7)(4 16 12 8).
This means that the following automorphism equations hold for the AES round function.
Proposition 11. For any byte permutation P i , i = 1, 2, 3 defined above, the equation
This way we have found a property analogous to the complementation property of the DES round function (see for example p. 248 in [5] ).
Conclusions
Novel invariances of the mapping I • A • S • M were found. It follows that for big sets of round subkeys there are regularities in the corresponding round functions. On the other hand, the existence of nontrivial invariances which hold for all 2
128
AES round subkeys is excluded.
Several cycle lengths for the complete AES round function with the all zero subkey were computed. It turns out that the cyclic order of this round function is much greater than the cyclic orders of its components. Nevertheless, for several special round keys some short cycles exist.
The self-duality properties described in Section 6 confirm the assessments given in other publications that the AES components have several unexpected structural properties.
We conclude that the AES has many algebraic properties which have not been found before in other block ciphers. In particular, the round function seems to have more invariants than the round function of DES. The results are not necessarily suitable to break AES. But in combination with other approaches they may lead to new insights and analysis methods.
